Abstract: "Actions" are normally thought of as taken by individuals. But to understand their quality, it is not enough to classify them from the perspective of individual psychology (rational vs. emotional, technical vs. artistic, etc.). We need to grasp their relation to those forms of collective life which have a historical existence independent of specific individual action (institutions, the conventions of social gathering, the organizing principles of games, architecture, music, ritual, etc.). This paper focuses on what characteristics such forms of collective life share, not what seems to separate them (eg. into sacred vs secular, technology vs creative art). The main features emphasized are their choreography, that is their enactment within commonly understood patterns of a spatial and temporal kind, as well as rules of interactive movement; and their ceremonial character, something which can be found in simple situations such as a conversation or a meal, though much more intensely in major religious ritual. A particularly resonant image for these enactments of social life is the dance. Because there is a ceremonial aspect to all social interaction, the paper argues that individual action, necessarily oriented to the social context, always has an "artful" side (however habitual or technical). The paper draws on the writings of Wittgenstein on action, and those of Collingwood on language and art, to shape the argument. Illustrations are provided of the "artful" employment of language (especially by actors on the stage), the "artful" side of material culture, and from the author's own ethnographic studies, the significance of dance among Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia.
motivated by high emotion. To understand the qualities of such individuals' acts, it does not get us very far to characterize the monastery as a sacred, and the stock exchange as secular (though they share a certain ceremonial character). For both the monk and the investor, elements of both the mind, and the heart, are probably engaged in their professional work, though they are moving within very different material worlds with their own conventions of social space and social time.
Some of the most creative work in the field has managed to retain a sense of the fluidity and imprecision of human motivation, while retaining a focus on the patterned character of social interactions and the forms of productive life as they have been shaped historically. Bearing in mind, from this perspective, the multiplicity of intentions and motivations that may lie behind any given act, we should reject the idea of a permanent line between the pragmatic and the symbolic, or the technical and what I term here the "artful". This term is intended here to recognize the individual's consciousness that his or her specific acts contribute to wider outcomes involving responses from and judgement by others, within the expectations of what is assumed a shared project. There is, from this point of view, an aspect of the "artful" in all action and social practice.
Philosophers have sometimes usefully assisted anthropologists by exploring the way that human phenomena defy conventional classifications of all sorts; whether into ritual/ secular, subjective/social, or public/private. This sceptical approach I have found appealing in the work of both Ludwig Wittgenstein and the archaeologist-philosopher R. G. Collingwood (near contemporaries). For example, in this essay I mention specifically how Wittgenstein's treatment of ceremony, and Collingwood's of art, have helped clarify my own approach to the phenomena of social action-the fullest general treatment to date is my book The Ceremonial Animal (James 2003) ; and a recent extended application may be found in my account of the flowering of dance, song, and music among Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia (James 2007) .
1 Both these studies give central place to dance as a specific form of activity involving individual, bodily rulegoverned performance within a conventionally formatted space, time-frame, and interactive repertoire: and at the same time, emphasize its appropriateness as a metaphor for social practice in general.
Dance often seems to defy the oppositions of pragmatic/symbolic and individual/ collective-as do song, music, and other kinds of performative action. And while it is not obviously very "rational", nor is it necessarily heavily emotional, or ritually loaded. Could we not say usefully that it has to some degree a "ceremonial" character, inherent perhaps in its received choreography, and that there is an "artful" element in the way that participants join in and even modify that choreography? In my view, a very large range of human activity shares these characteristics: think of the circulation of the traffic in a big city, think of the organized life of a school, with its times and spaces for work and play, its special costumes, its social arrangements into classes and the role playing of pupils and teachers; think of the social life of a beachside café. Think of a conversational encounter. Think even of a farmer ploughing a lonely field; and then recall Bourdieu's intensive exploration of the complex "meanings" of this practice in a Kabyle village (Bourdieu 1977, 100-104, 135-9) . To some extent, one is always acting in a socially understood arena, marked by conventions of spacing, timing, and mutual giveand-take. One may be alone, in a spatial or even subjectively experiential way, but one is part of a wider choreography in which others are also engaged. One's action may seem singular, such as ploughing; but recall the Kabyle woman, weaving those patterns indoors which themselves are interwoven, poetically, with the ploughing of outdoors. Together their imaginative interlinkage adds what Bourdieu himself terms "enchantment" to her plain act of working the loom (ibid., 115]. In this sense, no action is entirely "habitual", in the sense of the actor being deaf and blind to the aesthetic implications of how he or she actually performs it, and how it will be evaluated by others.
It would clearly be wrong, however, to assume that all social action was equally "artful". Any given action gives rise to multiple potential significances, and some social occasions are fertile ground for the intensification of the "ceremonial" quality of our engagement with others. We could imagine a range of degrees of intensity in the "ceremonial" qualities of social encounters and events, and thus of the potential artfulness with which participants engage in them, from say the casual conversation over the garden fence to the great festivals of the religious calendar. Collingwood's formulation of an essentially overlapping, and hierarchically encompassing, "scale of forms" as applied to philosophical concepts (1932, might capture well the way we should discriminate between relatively intense, and relatively casual, ceremoniality in the forms of our social life. From this angle, it would follow that there would be degrees of what I call the "artful" aspect of action in relation to these forms.
In the warmer regions of the world, it is easy to grow gourds-varieties like squash and melons, they grow on creeping vines, and can reach right over fences or the roofs of dwellings. Some grow quite long stems before swelling up into spherical form. If the fruits are left to harden, the shells can be cut into various shapes, most particularly for spherical containers for water or home-made beer, or half-spheres (calabashes) for food bowls and drinking cups. In the hilly regions of the Sudan-Ethiopian borderlands, they are also used as wind-instruments, either the small sphere or more usually the longer stem section being carved as a flute and blown across the top. Sometimes bamboo stems are used. Instruments of this kind are occasionally blown singly, but more often, and more interestingly, they are played by men in ensembles. Among the minority Uduk-speaking people of the Sudan, the majority of whom were displaced by civil war in the late 1980s but eventually found "safe haven" in a refugee scheme set up in 1993 in western Ethiopia, these flute ensembles, often associated with dance styles, were popular. Music and dancing were not often seen in the string of sites where the refugees settled for brief periods over several years after the initial displacement. But in the Ethiopian scheme at Bonga, there was a lively scene of music, song and dance-and there I saw something I had never seen before. Flutes were being cut, shaped and tuned for the barangu dance music. I had been told back in the 1960s that this type of music was obsolete. I knew the name because there were myths about the barangu dance, associated with the beginning of human time. And here it was being recreated in the refugee setting (though other accustomed kinds of music were being made out of unaccustomed materials, such as discarded plastic cans, debris from the world of international aid; see James 2007, 215-43) . The resurgence of "traditional" music and dance happened alongside, and seemed to be stimulated by, a rising enthusiasm for evangelical Christianity. Although essentially "secular" in the conventional sense, the Christian condemnation of dance lent an extra "rituality" to its performance, a moral density of meaning, not necessarily evident to the casual observer.
Wittgenstein, who is a primary reference point in Schatzki's formulation of the social nature of human practice, famously expounded the "ceremonial" character of human action, a vision which I have attempted to build on. He wrote of fire, and firemaking, as a rite whose significance could not be missed (1993 [c.1931] , discussed in James 2003, 112-14) and of the way that ritual pervades the various domains of human life. Whereas, however, he made an exception of eating, drinking, and other "animallike" activities, contrasting these with the "ritual", modern anthropology would certainly include even the most basic bodily acts in the broad church of "ritual", if we allow an overlap here with what Wittgenstein himself seems to characterize as the "ceremonial". A more general extension of this concept allows us precisely to see what is distinctive about the actions of human beings, as distinct from those of (the other) animals (James 2003, 6-7) . There are problems with the word "ritual", after all, which are a legacy of the history of the word itself, rooted in the Christian church and only in modern times released into ordinary English to lend a cheaper sort of "sacred aura" to special practices which might have nothing to do with religion as normally understood (Asad 1993 ). The word "ceremonial" does not depend for its significance on a dichotomy between the sacred and the profane, evoking rather better the existence of a range of degrees, or intensity of depth, in the ceremoniality of specific forms of action.
Some individual acts carry only a whiff of artful intention-think of the initial cutting of a gourd fruit, which might be used plainly as a food bowl, or with a more concentrated or heightened sense of ceremony, in the rejuvenation of long-forgotten music and myth. Either or both possibilities, or imagined kinds of enjoyment, could be in the mind's-eye of the grower. Here, emotional memory can infuse everyday language and everyday productive work in ways that endow simple actions with multiple possible outcomes, including those of intense and formal ceremony. In the following sections I elaborate a little on this "artful" quality of first, language, and then acts of material production.
Language as "artful action" R. G. Collingwood wrote much that resonates with Wittgenstein's well-known writings. Peter Lewis, for example, has drawn attention to their similar treatment of language as part of social interactivity. They both "hold that to understand the logical character of language we must take into account linguistic activities. For Collingwood, language is expressive activity-bodily activity involving gestures with speech-organs and other parts of the body. For Wittgenstein … "the speaking of language is part of an activity" … including such things as describing, questioning, translating, thanking, greeting, cursing, joking, and so on" (Lewis 1998, 35) . The existence of language, moreover, depends on "patterns of behaviour which can be repeated by speakers and reidentified by hearers" (ibid., 36). I will restrict my further discussion here to some of Collingwood's manuscripts recently published for the first time. He wrote, for example, "Language is not a tool or instrument…. It is a mode of conduct, an activity" (Collingwood 2005 [n.d.] , 18). His main concern in the newly available writings is not so much with his critique of positivism and his promotion of the logic of "question-andanswer" (1939, (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) , but with the nature of whole stories or other integral texts. In the case of folk-tales, he argues that these may have remarkably long histories of transmission and gradual transformation through their repeated re-enactment, carrying with them elements of "enchantment" from the pre-industrial world. Collingwood ( [1931 , 109-10) emphasizes always, in considering stories or poems as he does other forms of art, the joint presence of conscious intent and feeling in the artist:
A man cannot be trying to write a poem, unless he knows that he is doing so. If there are premonitory symptoms of a poem's inward growth …[these] cannot yet be described as an attempt to write the poem. That attempt only begins when the poet … has set himself consciously to complete the process whose beginning has come upon him thus unawares.
Further, the fact of trying to write a poem "implies the knowledge of what a poem is; or rather … what a poem should be. This knowledge is a philosophy of art…". Every work of art is conceived through the agency of some theory … because theories change as experience changes, it does not follow that the theory is a mere description of the experience. It would be truer to describe the experience as an attempt to put the theory into practice (ibid., 110). Now if we allow a hint of this insight to grace even the most secular action, such as cooking, then it follows from what Collingwood proposes that a good range of our actions are aimed at putting theories into practice-they are accompanied by what he terms self-knowledge. Such "theories" very evidently have a "social" existence out there somewhere, in that the schema of what a poem or a proper meal should be has in itself a history. Collingwood was a practising archaeologist, and his approach to folk tales was explicitly as "artefacts" from our shared history, though of a different sort from the usual pots and axes regarded as evidence of the past (2005 [1936-7] ).
Lewis is a little skeptical about Collingwood's published claim that "Every utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes is a work of art" (1938, 285)-presumably in the sense expounded in the quotations above. While this may seem to some to be going too far, I don't think that any of us would wish to draw a hard and fast line between what is "artful" language, and what is somehow totally mechanical or devoid of conscious intent, however brief. Words are always potentially nested in larger series and interactive exchanges, as are acts, including the gestures and tone of voice that go with spoken language. However, if we accept that Collingwood's "scale of forms" could be directly applied here to the relatively artful or non-artful ways of speaking we live with all the time, we should have no problem in accepting this claim. As a species of action, language is both "rooted in the lives of human beings" and in its actual expressive exchanges is shaped by artistic intent, through the mastery of what Lewis sums up as the "subtleties of expression, verbal and visual, these fine shades of behaviour" that Collingwood encapsulates in the concept of "community of language", encompassing speaker and hearer (Lewis 1998 , 37, Collingwood 1938 ).
An intriguing and original book by the Danish anthropologist, Kirsten Hastrup, throws clear light on this question and identifies further layers of significance in the very conjunction of language, gesture, and artful action (Hastrup 2004) . It is a sustained ethnography of stage actors and specifically of the world of Shakespearean productions, with the larger aim of exploring action and agency in general. Hastrup discusses how "the stage" used to be partitioned off by academics from "real life", while specialist studies focused almost entirely on the finished drama production itself, the history of theatre, and artistic criticism as such. Her enquiries, however, enter the world of actors as they discuss their work with her, rehearse and re-rehearse, reflect on their own and others' performances, and interact with the producers and stage hands. These actors are real people earning a living-the stage is not a world apart, it is their life. Hastrup argues for the presence of a "double self-consciousness" which is deliberately cultivated as a part of the professional's skill at creating the specially intense "world within a world" which the play becomes for the audience. The "art" of acting on stage is perhaps, however, not so very different from acting in what is misleadingly dubbed ordinary life. Some vignettes of ordinary daily encounters can be mini-dramas in themselves (and a whole volume was recently devoted to the anthropology of "Irony in Action"-that is, everyday action (Fernandez and Huber 2001) . Hastrup reminds us that Shakespeare knew all this very well, pointing for example to his fondness for disguises, plays-withina-play; and we might add counterposed worlds of spiritual and human on the same stage. His characters themselves quite often comment, on stage, about the complexity of acting and of human character. Shakespearean actors have to convey multiple messages through these layers of "pretence", as in the original productions of As You Like It where a man would play Rosalind, herself in male disguise, eventually to be revealed as a woman, and so on.
This study challenges us to think hard about some of the ambiguities in our own behaviour, playing this role or that in different circles, sometimes having to dissemble ("act") as we move around on a daily basis, even in the most settled-seeming habitus. Our actions are never without "art" in this sense, nor are we slow to identify it in others. It is our familiarity with the artful aspect of everyday practices that makes us good audiences for stage plays, in which we enter a rather special level of "interaction" with the players. We can accept the way in which the stage literally "frames" the unfolding story within limits of space, and time-a "dramatic unity", and the way that a play, like a concert piece or a work of material art, aims at a kind of closure. In everyday practice, the chains of action and response tend to be open-ended; you are never sure where the sense of completion or closure will come, if ever, though you may be broadly aiming at an end (take-over of a business, implementation of a peace plan, a good marriage for your daughter, etc.).
Transforming materials as "artful" action
Returning briefly to Collingwood, we should recall that his conception of history was of res gestae, things done, actions taken, in the past. His approach to archaeological sites and artefacts was to ask what were people doing here, and what were their aims in acting so? Historians had to use their imagination in intepreting the material evidence, drawing on their capacity not only for logical argument but on their reserves of empathy, of feeling for the intentions of past others. His approach to the work of the artist, that is primarily the painter or sculptor, also focused as much on their ability to express and convey emotion through their works as on their technical mastery. While he did draw a distinction between fine art and popular crafts, he emphasized a continuum with what he understood as "magic". The roots of fine art lay in the magic, or enchantment, of premodern creativity (1938, passim; 2005, 195-234) . And much of that magical feeling was to do with the connection between persons and things. He wrote, for example, of the joy of using a sharp chisel for cutting, or sailing a fine boat before the wind. More "intensely", perhaps, in the sense in which I am using it here, he pondered how and why it should be that on the death of King George VI, his yacht was scuttled at sea, rather than being put on the open market for someone else to use (2005, 198) . That distinctly "ceremonial" act, a kind of sacrifice that would be recognized as such over many apparent barriers of language and culture, reminds us of Wittgenstein's pondering of the way that we do not need to be told the meaning of fire, and the idea sacrifice it might seem to invite (discussed further in James 2003, 112-14, 255) .
Social relations would of course be non-existent without material acts, the transformation of substances, and the production of objects both useful and beautiful. Aesthetic qualities are now recognized as permeating even the humblest material practices which may be pivotal in themselves to social life. There is plenty of backing in the thinking of today's anthropology and archaeology for such a way of regarding "practice". For example, a strong argument was made by the late Alfred Gell in his book Art and Agency (1998) for dismantling the Western sharp dichotomy between the "fine arts" and the humbler crafts which fill our lives. Gell adopts a close focus on the chains of social connection we can trace from the agent who makes, say, a carving, transforming that object into something active as it produces an impact on the person who receives it or is otherwise influenced by it. His claims are for an anthropological theory of art which "is a theory of the social relations that obtain in the neighbourhood of works of art.… Social relations only exist in so far as they are made manifest in actions" (Gell 1998, 8) . He applies this approach very effectively, for example, to the competitive tradition of house building and elaborate decoration among the Maori in the early colonial period (ibid., 251-8). Of special interest I think to the present discussion is his emphasis on the "anticipated outcome" (his italics) which accompanies the making of a new house; it is to outdo the neighbours. "The building of the house was a collective, intentional, action, and "action" is intrinsically future-oriented" (ibid., 256). Ethnographic museums, in this light, no less than art galleries, display the skills which have gone into the making of bows and arrows, boats, pottery and so on from all over the world-aesthetically powerful in their impact ("agency") upon their successive users and imitators over a historical trajectory of connected activity, and upon us too (perhaps an impact of a different quality).
Archaeologists themselves have come to see more "life" in the material fallout of past activity than they used to, and learned to regard objects as clues to the spatial and temporal human connections of the one-time social world that produced them. Clive Gamble has taken this line of imaginative enquiry right back to times before Homo sapiens emerged from Africa (some 60,000 years ago). He has asked what roles factors linking bodily action, material artifacts, and the metaphorical re-imagining of their potential significance might have played in making that emergence possible, not to mention the consequent quite rapid colonization of the globe (Gamble 2007, 87-110) .
We might speculate that levels of intention and deliberately composed modes of action must have become more salient, for example, with the use of containers as distinct from instruments such as sticks and stones-a turning point emphasized by Gamble. He does not date this point in hominid history, but it is so far clear that while we are gaining enormous new appreciation of the tool-using and "cultural" life of other primates, none use containers as we typically do (skin bags, gourds, pots, huts, graves, boats etc.). You could pick up a stick and throw it in a very immediate way, without too much "reflection". But the making of containers is more plausibly linked to a degree of purposeful, "self-conscious" or reflective action. This "purposefulness" in turn implies action within some frame of spatially organized interaction with others, and within some scheme of agreed timings. You carve a bowl or calabash from a gourd, to hold water for your children for tomorrow; your hut, or even grave, defines your wider social linkages for past and future; you build a boat to cross the river or the seas.
Today the archaeologists see individual techniques, such as stone flaking and so on, as part of a chain of socially organized technical operations, a chaîne opératoire (Lemonnier 1992) . Chris Wingfield has provided a very good example of this concept, with reference to the making of ostrich eggshell beads in the Kalahari. It has being going on for at least forty thousand years, but the techniques of making the beads have shifted subtly, along with the whole point of the operation (they are now mostly for tourists; Wingfield 2005, 126-31). Such projects involve acts which anticipate not only the next step in the immediate sequential chain of technique, but beyond that, at some level, surely in large part consciously, a whole future scenario. The blacksmith hammers the iron, and shoes the horse: that horse, as he well knows, is destined for ploughing, or for racing, or for war. Actions, like words, are nested into further sets of actions, and further series of planned actions of a socially-relevant kind; "practices" derive their "meaning" not only from the immediate context but from such longer term aims, and their outcome will be judged as well done, or less well done. This "future-orientation" of actions implies the presence of strategic and artful intention as a general characteristic of practice itself.
Concluding remarks: a return to "the social"
Accepting as common ground that social practices are somehow "out there" (see, for example, Schatzki's discussion, 1996, 98-110) , and yet finding a way of accommodating the agency and creative capacity of persons, is our key "problem". This question constitutes the core of what I understand the varieties of practice theory to be grappling with. Personally I would hold that this core question leads directly to a recognition of the historicity of social forms as the context in which personal agency takes shape. Despite the caricatures of Durkheimian sociology nowadays fed to students, our current concerns are central to that tradition too. This is particularly clear in the works of Marcel Mauss-a source of inspiration to Lévi-Strauss, whose intellectualist structuralism certainly helped provoke Bourdieu to turn again to concrete social life and put forward the basis of what has become the "practice theory" of today (1977 [1972] ). There has been renewed attention to Mauss's writings in recent years, with several translations from the French being made available in English for the first time. His approach to social phenomena was, from the start, consistently more focused on what we mean today by "practice" than was Durkheim's. In a 1901 piece on "Sociology" he published with a colleague, for example, we read with reference to economics:
Consider the large number of notions, institutions and habits, presupposed in the simplest acts of a merchant or of a worker who seeks to earn his living: the obvious fact is that neither of them have created the forms which their activity necessarily takes; neither of them invented credit, interest, wages, exchange or money Fauconnet, 2005 [1901] , 6).
Similar points are made with reference to language, to marriage and domestic life, and to religion. There are "habits" of acting, shared within a society at a specific time in history:
Some of them invite reflection because of their own importance…. Other habits remain unexpressed and diffuse, more or less unconscious…. These collective habits and the unending transformations they undergo are the proper subject-matter of sociology" (ibid., 8).
Mauss's own later work shifts analysis increasingly from the vision of the way that "the group" endows the individual with these habits of acting, to the modes of acting and interacting as such between relevant parties (persons representing either just themselves or more often collective interests); the best-known source is his essay on "The Gift" (1990 [1925] ). His essay on "Prayer" (2003 [1909] ) illustrates the shift clearly, from a "Durkheimian" holistic vision of religion, to the specific, historically placed act of an individual speaking to the gods. In this context, "practice" is intimately bound up with human intent, and some level of individual consciousness of what is being done (even if in the context of a general rite).
Although there would be no acts, and no practices, without real flesh and blood, speaking and feeling persons, theoretical writings in this field often seem to gloss over the specificity of conscious agency, and the historicity of acts. In this essay I have tried to rescue these, without sliding too far the other way, but retaining the essential vision of human actions as social phenomena-belonging, as Schatzki has said, to the co-existence of human lives. It is as important as ever to retain this focus, in view of the challenges from economic, genetic, and behavioural reductionism in the social sciences (see for example a recent short but sharp collection The Retreat from the Social, Kapferer 2005) . Even a plain act of ploughing the field or cooking a simple family dinner provides some emotional satisfaction-or dissatisfaction-in the way it enters into the wider patterning of our social lives with others. Such patterning, I suggest, has qualities, amounting to a kind of "ceremonial power" over our everyday actions. The more elaborate kinds of social occasion, such as dance or song or prayer, which probably occupy a larger part of human life than we moderns are used to assuming, are even more obviously key ends to which "artful" action is directed by individual persons.
Consider some more comments of the early Mauss, in another recently translated piece:
Only in the completely modern period and still in restricted circles has art for art's sake become a principle. In other civilisations, and no doubt it will be the same in future civilisations, art serves for everything and colours everything. In religion the rhythm of the poetry and music, the poetry and music themselves, the theatrical combination, the dance, the fine image, reproduced, mimed, or even dreamed, play an immense role; in morality, it is etiquette, propriety, elegance, and beauty of manners which are striven for equally with duties and rituals. The majority of needs or rather tastes, and … the techniques themselves, are commanded by the sense of beauty … we speak for example of cuisine….
[T]echnology seems historically to be one of the first domains to have closed itself off in its own sphere (Mauss 2005 (Mauss [1927 , 46). I must leave aside the temptation to continue quoting here from Mauss on the social nature of technology (including both movements of the body itself and the use of implements) as a "practical art" (ibid., 47 et seqq.), and the intimate link between what he calls practices and representations in "social physiology"-thus "paving the way for a general theory of representations and a general theory of action" (ibid., 57-9, 63).
To return to my opening metaphor, the dance is a practical art: it involves both representation and enactment. It does not really "exists" until it is performed by real live people; each performance, and each set of individuals who may perform it, is unique. But the movements, and even the innovations, are defined as such within socially "formatted" and collectively understood frameworks of space and time. As a general image of agency within social form, the dance has more to offer than the common renderings of Bourdieu's habitus (itself derived from Mauss); you are aware of your own skill and its limits when you join the dance-in perhaps old-fashioned language, you are a fully conscious agent, your feelings are engaged as well as your feet. And a dance step, even if just hinted at by one person on their own without an audience, like a single word or a note on the piano, "hangs together" (see discussion in Schatzki 1996, 14 and passim) with others in the shapes of past or future artful expression, shapes which are "out there" somewhere in that they have a history, are valued to the degree that they are transmitted over the generations and recognizable to current others, and in at least these two senses have an existence "out there".
We could conclude by returning to the growing of squashes and gourds by the Sudanese refugees around their temporary huts in Ethiopia. They were planted because of their usefulness in general. Many who grew gourds were unaware that a few people from a small former village still remembered the way they could be used for making music of a deeply appealing kind. But when this group got its act together, in quite a literal sense, the news spread, people gathered to join the dancing, and they themselves reminded the ethnographer of the old songs.
To cut and shape a gourd fruit might in itself seem a straightforward action. In this case, it is clear for a start that one man on his own could not create the intended music-the ensemble should number eleven, thought of as a matriline with the grandmother as the leading flute. The affective aspect could scarcely be clearer; the mythical echoes, and the fresh enjoyment of the dancing, captured the attention of a generation who had grown up without knowing the barangu at all. The people were not just reenacting a kind of musical habitus, though: they had had plenty of time to reflect on their own history, their own deprivations and the political pressures they had been-and were, still, under. The myths of the barangu were focused not only on the emergence of human life, but also on the beginnings of death. In the circumstances of displacement and loss to war and disease over the previous years, not to mention the competition from evangelical Christianity, I believe the simple cutting and shaping of a gourd-stem had a great deal more resonance, as an act of artful practice, than might at first have been apparent.
